Janady13/missionmatch / internal/integration/admin_integration_test.go

Source identity

Field	Recorded value
Source type	GitHub source
Original record	Janady13/missionmatch / internal/integration/admin_integration_test.go
Date	Not specified in source
Repository	Janady13/missionmatch
Revision	720d47fae476b0d38477ae4401697d372b1ea2bc
Branch	feature/opportunity-to-outcome
Path or archive member	internal/integration/admin_integration_test.go
Original SHA-256	91e2023c40fc40a2d69f241befdddb1b493479a4a3b1b0dbcaaf724ba6292b9f
Git blob SHA	8c99c53371796ad0d5e30785b59ede6c49b8e8a0
Reading-copy SHA-256	91e2023c40fc40a2d69f241befdddb1b493479a4a3b1b0dbcaaf724ba6292b9f

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These 2 records contain identical original source bytes. Their paths and revisions remain part of the archive.

Original record	Branch or archive	Revision / identifier	Original location
Janady13/missionmatch / internal/integration/admin_integration_test.go	feature/opportunity-to-outcome	720d47fae476b0d38477ae4401697d372b1ea2bc	Open original
Janady13/missionmatch / internal/integration/admin_integration_test.go	feature/aioe-upgrade	2178e7298d0e5d9af83afa12402fd587f0ba6ed8	Open original

Recovered source transcript

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//go:build integration

package integration

import (
	"context"
	"testing"

	"github.com/google/uuid"

	"github.com/missionworkforce/missionmatch/internal/modules/recruiting"
	"github.com/missionworkforce/missionmatch/internal/platform/security"
	"github.com/missionworkforce/missionmatch/internal/platform/tenant"
)

// WARNING. Point MM_APP_DSN and MM_MIGRATOR_DSN at a scratch or staging database, never at production.

// seedRoleUser creates a user at a given role and returns a context acting as them.
func seedRoleUser(t *testing.T, org uuid.UUID, name, role string) (uuid.UUID, context.Context) {
	t.Helper()
	var id uuid.UUID
	if err := migrator.QueryRow(context.Background(),
		`INSERT INTO users (organization_id, email, full_name, role, status)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'active') RETURNING id`,
		org, name+"-"+uuid.New().String()[:8]+"@example.com", name, role).Scan(&id); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("seed %s: %v", role, err)
	}
	ctx := tenant.WithUser(tenant.WithOrg(context.Background(), org.String()),
		tenant.Principal{UserID: id.String(), Role: role})
	return id, ctx
}

// TestManagerCanReassignADeskAndARecruiterCannot is the behaviour the whole tier exists for, proved
// against a real database rather than against the matrix alone.
func TestManagerCanReassignADeskAndARecruiterCannot(t *testing.T) {
	org := seedOrg(t)
	aliceID, alice := seedRoleUser(t, org, "Alice Holder", "recruiter")
	_, bob := seedRoleUser(t, org, "Bob Peer", "recruiter")
	_, manager := seedRoleUser(t, org, "Mia Manager", "manager")
	svc := reqSvc()

	client, err := svc.CreateClient(alice, recruiting.CreateClientInput{Name: "Contested Account"})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("create client: %v", err)
	}
	id := uuid.MustParse(client.ID)
	if client.OwnerName != "Alice Holder" {
		t.Fatalf("the creating recruiter did not take the account, owner = %q", client.OwnerName)
	}

	// A peer recruiter is refused, and the refusal names who holds it.
	name := "Bob's edit"
	_, err = svc.UpdateClient(bob, id, recruiting.UpdateClientInput{
		ExpectedUpdatedAt: client.UpdatedAt, Name: &name})
	var notOwner *recruiting.ErrNotOwner
	if !asErrNotOwner(err, &notOwner) {
		t.Fatalf("a peer recruiter was allowed to edit another recruiter's account: %v", err)
	}

	// The manager may reassign it, which before this tier required admin, and admin also carries PII
	// deletion and account management.
	moved, err := svc.Reassign(manager, id, aliceID)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("a manager could not reassign a desk: %v", err)
	}
	if moved.OwnerUserID != aliceID.String() {
		t.Errorf("after reassignment the owner is %q", moved.OwnerName)
	}
	// And a recruiter still cannot.
	if _, err := svc.Reassign(bob, id, aliceID); err == nil {
		t.Error("a recruiter reassigned an account, so the manager tier grants nothing")
	}
}

func asErrNotOwner(err error, target **recruiting.ErrNotOwner) bool {
	if err == nil {
		return false
	}
	e, ok := err.(*recruiting.ErrNotOwner)
	if ok {
		*target = e
	}
	return ok
}

// TestManagerCannotReachAdminAuthorityLive. The containment property, exercised through the service
// rather than the matrix, because a capability check that is never called protects nothing.
func TestManagerCannotReachAdminAuthorityLive(t *testing.T) {
	org := seedOrg(t)
	_, manager := seedRoleUser(t, org, "Mia Manager", "manager")
	svc := reqSvc()

	// Org settings are owner only. A manager changing the timezone would move what "today" means for
	// every count in the product.
	if _, err := svc.SetTimeZone(manager, "America/Chicago"); err == nil {
		t.Error("a manager changed the organization timezone")
	}
	// But the capabilities a manager DOES hold work, or the tier is unusable.
	if _, err := svc.CreateRequisition(manager, recruiting.CreateRequisitionInput{Title: "Manager role"}); err != nil {
		t.Errorf("a manager could not open a job order: %v", err)
	}
	if _, _, err := svc.Export(manager, recruiting.ExportPipeline, recruiting.PeriodMonth, ""); err != nil {
		t.Errorf("a manager could not export: %v", err)
	}
}

// TestCapabilitiesTravelWithTheSession. The list the browser gates on and the checks the server enforces
// come from one matrix, so a screen cannot offer something the API will refuse.
func TestCapabilitiesMatchTheServerForEveryRole(t *testing.T) {
	for _, role := range []security.Role{
		security.RoleViewer, security.RoleMember, security.RoleRecruiter,
		security.RoleManager, security.RoleAdmin, security.RoleOwner,
	} {
		caps := security.CapabilitiesOf(role)
		set := map[string]bool{}
		for _, c := range caps {
			set[c] = true
		}
		for _, cap := range []security.Capability{
			security.CapDeskReassign, security.CapOrgSettings, security.CapPrivacyErase,
			security.CapExportRun, security.CapCandidateRead, security.CapUserInvite,
		} {
			if set[string(cap)] != security.Has(role, cap) {
				t.Errorf("role %s: session list and server disagree about %s", role, cap)
			}
		}
	}
}

// TestManagerRoleIsAcceptedByTheDatabase. The Go vocabulary and the CHECK constraint have to agree, or
// promoting someone is a 500.
func TestManagerRoleIsAcceptedByTheDatabase(t *testing.T) {
	org := seedOrg(t)
	if _, err := migrator.Exec(context.Background(),
		`INSERT INTO users (organization_id, email, full_name, role, status)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, 'A Manager', 'manager', 'active')`,
		org, "mgr-"+uuid.New().String()[:8]+"@example.com"); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("the database refused the manager role: %v", err)
	}
	// And a role the code does not know is still refused, so the constraint has not simply been widened
	// to anything.
	if _, err := migrator.Exec(context.Background(),
		`INSERT INTO users (organization_id, email, full_name, role, status)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, 'A Wizard', 'wizard', 'active')`,
		org, "wiz-"+uuid.New().String()[:8]+"@example.com"); err == nil {
		t.Error("the database accepted an unknown role")
	}
}

// TestReassignmentIsTenantScoped. A manager in one organization must not be able to hand another
// organization's account to anyone.
func TestReassignmentIsTenantScoped(t *testing.T) {
	orgA := seedOrg(t)
	_, aliceA := seedRoleUser(t, orgA, "Alice A", "recruiter")
	orgB := seedOrg(t)
	_, managerB := seedRoleUser(t, orgB, "Manager B", "manager")
	userB, _ := seedRoleUser(t, orgB, "Recruiter B", "recruiter")
	svc := reqSvc()

	client, err := svc.CreateClient(aliceA, recruiting.CreateClientInput{Name: "Tenant A account"})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("create in A: %v", err)
	}
	if _, err := svc.Reassign(managerB, uuid.MustParse(client.ID), userB); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("a manager reassigned an account belonging to another tenant")
	}
	// Control: A's own account is still hers.
	got, err := svc.GetClient(aliceA, uuid.MustParse(client.ID))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("read back in A: %v", err)
	}
	if got.OwnerName != "Alice A" {
		t.Errorf("owner = %q after the cross tenant attempt", got.OwnerName)
	}
}