Janady13/missionmatch / internal/platform/security/csrf_test.go

Source identity

Field	Recorded value
Source type	GitHub source
Original record	Janady13/missionmatch / internal/platform/security/csrf_test.go
Date	Not specified in source
Repository	Janady13/missionmatch
Revision	720d47fae476b0d38477ae4401697d372b1ea2bc
Branch	feature/opportunity-to-outcome
Path or archive member	internal/platform/security/csrf_test.go
Original SHA-256	250e2c6e2c683a61f939deb2d6c05ec545fa9ecfe2c3b4ab603d92e5bb7666a7
Git blob SHA	5554be0379d35508840d6ff5b728dc983c893475
Reading-copy SHA-256	250e2c6e2c683a61f939deb2d6c05ec545fa9ecfe2c3b4ab603d92e5bb7666a7

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Original record	Branch or archive	Revision / identifier	Original location
Janady13/missionmatch / internal/platform/security/csrf_test.go	feature/opportunity-to-outcome	720d47fae476b0d38477ae4401697d372b1ea2bc	Open original
Janady13/missionmatch / internal/platform/security/csrf_test.go	feature/aioe-upgrade	2178e7298d0e5d9af83afa12402fd587f0ba6ed8	Open original

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package security

import (
	"crypto/hmac"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/base64"
	"net/http"
	"net/http/httptest"
	"strings"
	"testing"
)

var csrfKey = []byte("csrf test key, thirty two bytes!")

// A token minted for one session must not verify against another. This is the property the type
// claims (the config calls the key "HMAC key binding a CSRF token to its session") and the property
// that makes signed double submit worth more than an unsigned one: without it, anyone who can call
// the public mint endpoint holds a token that verifies inside every victim's session.
func TestCSRFTokenDoesNotCrossSessions(t *testing.T) {
	c := NewCSRF(csrfKey)
	victim, attacker := "victim-session-token", "attacker-session-token"

	tok, err := c.Issue(attacker)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
	}
	if !c.Valid(tok, attacker) {
		t.Fatal("token issued for a session must verify in that session")
	}
	if c.Valid(tok, victim) {
		t.Fatal("token issued for one session verified in another, the token is not session bound")
	}
	if c.Valid(tok, "") {
		t.Fatal("session bound token verified as anonymous")
	}
}

// The anonymous binding is a binding of its own, not a wildcard: the pre login endpoints need it, and
// it must stop working once a session exists rather than becoming a universal token.
func TestCSRFAnonymousTokenIsNotUniversal(t *testing.T) {
	c := NewCSRF(csrfKey)
	tok, err := c.Issue("")
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
	}
	if !c.Valid(tok, "") {
		t.Fatal("anonymous token must verify with no session")
	}
	if c.Valid(tok, "some-session-token") {
		t.Fatal("anonymous token verified inside a session")
	}
}

// A token in the old unbound format (HMAC over the nonce alone) must be refused, not honored for
// compatibility and not panic the verifier.
func TestCSRFLegacyUnboundTokenIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
	c := NewCSRF(csrfKey)
	nonce := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("0123456789abcdef"))
	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, csrfKey)
	mac.Write([]byte(nonce))
	legacy := nonce + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))

	if c.Valid(legacy, "") || c.Valid(legacy, "any-session") {
		t.Fatal("a token minted before session binding must fail closed")
	}
	for _, malformed := range []string{"", ".", "nodot", ".sigonly", "nonce."} {
		if c.Valid(malformed, "") {
			t.Fatalf("malformed token %q accepted", malformed)
		}
	}
}

// The middleware must recompute the binding from the session cookie on the request, so a stolen or
// separately minted token cannot be replayed against another user's session cookie.
func TestCSRFProtectBindsToRequestSession(t *testing.T) {
	c := NewCSRF(csrfKey)
	const csrfCookie, sessCookie, header = "mm_csrf", "mm_session", "X-CSRF-Token"
	mw := c.Protect(csrfCookie, header, sessCookie, []string{"https://app.example.gov"})

	handled := false
	h := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { handled = true }))

	post := func(token, session string) int {
		handled = false
		r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/users/invite", nil)
		r.Header.Set("Origin", "https://app.example.gov")
		r.Header.Set(header, token)
		r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: csrfCookie, Value: token})
		if session != "" {
			r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessCookie, Value: session})
		}
		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
		h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
		return w.Code
	}

	mine, err := c.Issue("my-session")
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
	}
	if code := post(mine, "my-session"); code != http.StatusOK || !handled {
		t.Fatalf("own session request rejected: status %d handled %v", code, handled)
	}
	if code := post(mine, "victim-session"); code != http.StatusForbidden || handled {
		t.Fatalf("token replayed against another session was allowed: status %d handled %v", code, handled)
	}
	anon, err := c.Issue("")
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
	}
	if code := post(anon, ""); code != http.StatusOK {
		t.Fatalf("anonymous request rejected: status %d", code)
	}
	if code := post(anon, "victim-session"); code != http.StatusForbidden {
		t.Fatalf("anonymous token accepted inside a session: status %d", code)
	}
}

// The signing input must not be reinterpretable: a nonce and a binding that concatenate to the same
// bytes under a different split must not produce the same signature.
func TestCSRFSigningInputIsUnambiguous(t *testing.T) {
	c := NewCSRF(csrfKey)
	a := c.sign("abc", "def")
	b := c.sign("abcdef", "")
	if strings.EqualFold(a, b) {
		t.Fatal("signing input is ambiguous across the nonce and session boundary")
	}
}