Janady13/missionmatch / frontend/src/lib/auth.ts

Source identity

Field	Recorded value
Source type	GitHub source
Original record	Janady13/missionmatch / frontend/src/lib/auth.ts
Date	Not specified in source
Repository	Janady13/missionmatch
Revision	720d47fae476b0d38477ae4401697d372b1ea2bc
Branch	feature/opportunity-to-outcome
Path or archive member	frontend/src/lib/auth.ts
Original SHA-256	99a615364eb15eb1914c26030fd764fdf762b7c788db1c23157d31272904e368
Git blob SHA	590ef74353a17f6473e48f6eeb103a61560dba6e
Reading-copy SHA-256	a45f8bbb0e889e148976abb3fca472d2e4ea152c4a8883c96031030c185cb975

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Recovered source transcript

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Credential-bearing and unrelated personal details were removed from this reading copy. The source identity and original checksum remain recorded.

import { request } from './api'

// The validated session principal returned by GET /api/auth/session (a tenant route, so it 403s when
// there is no active MFA satisfied session).
export interface SessionPrincipal {
  user_id: string
  org_id: string
  role: string
  mfa_enrolled: boolean
  // The resolved permission list, computed server side from the same matrix the API enforces. Gating on
  // this rather than on role name comparisons keeps one source of truth: duplicating the matrix in
  // TypeScript is how a screen ends up offering something the API refuses.
  //
  // It decides what is OFFERED, never what is allowed. Every endpoint keeps its own gate.
  capabilities: string[]

  // The granted product set. Role says what the user may DO; this says which of the four tools exists
  // for them at all. Like capabilities it decides what is OFFERED: each tool's API route group carries
  // its own server side gate, so hiding a tool here is presentation, not the enforcement.
  //
  // This is the EFFECTIVE set, already widened server side for the top seats, so a tenant superuser
  // provisioned with no grant rows still sees its tenant's products.
  tools: string[]

  // What the ORGANIZATION is entitled to, which is not the same question as what this user holds. Both
  // are needed to say WHY an entitlement control is disabled instead of leaving it silently grey.
  org_tools?: string[]

  // The signed in person's own identity, so the profile form opens with current values and a rename
  // renders everywhere on the next session read rather than only after a sign out.
  full_name?: string
  title?: string
  phone?: string
}

// ProfileInput sends only what is being changed. An omitted field is left alone by the server rather
// than blanked, which is why every field is optional rather than defaulting to an empty string.
export interface ProfileInput {
  full_name?: string
  title?: string
  phone?: string
}

// Profile is the server's view of an identity after a write.
export interface Profile {
  id: string
  email: string
  full_name: string
  title: string
  phone: string
  role: string
  status: string
}

// LoginResult and the invite accept result tell the UI the next step: verify an existing TOTP, or enroll
// one for the first time. The session token itself is the HttpOnly cookie, never in the JSON. When
// mfa_required is false (a pilot deployment with MFA disabled) the issued session is already active, so
// the UI skips the MFA step entirely.
export interface AuthStepResult {
  mfa_enrolled: boolean
  mfa_required: boolean
}

// EnrollResult carries the otpauth uri (rendered as a QR) and the raw secret (for manual entry).
export interface EnrollResult {
  otpauth_uri: string
  secret: string
}

export const authApi = {
  login: (email: string, password: [credential removed] =>
    request<AuthStepResult>('/auth/login', { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({ email, password }) }),
  inviteAccept: (token: string, password: [credential removed] =>
    request<AuthStepResult>('/auth/invite/accept', { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({ token, password }) }),
  mfaEnroll: () => request<EnrollResult>('/auth/mfa/enroll', { method: 'POST' }),
  mfaActivate: (code: string) =>
    request<AuthStepResult>('/auth/mfa/activate', { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({ code }) }),
  mfaVerify: (code: string) =>
    request<{ ok: boolean }>('/auth/mfa/verify', { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({ code }) }),
  mfaRecover: (code: string) =>
    request<{ ok: boolean }>('/auth/mfa/recover', { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({ code }) }),
  session: () => request<SessionPrincipal>('/auth/session'),
  logout: () => request<{ status: string }>('/auth/logout', { method: 'POST' }),
  logoutAll: () => request<{ status: string }>('/auth/logout-all', { method: 'POST' }),
  changePassword: [credential removed] string, new_password: [credential removed] =>
    request<{ status: string }>('/auth/password/change', {
      method: 'POST',
      body: JSON.stringify({ old_password, new_password }),
    }),

  // Self service, every role. The server takes the subject from the session, so there is no user id to
  // send and no way to point this at somebody else.
  updateOwnProfile: (v: ProfileInput) =>
    request<Profile>('/me/profile', { method: 'PATCH', body: JSON.stringify(v) }),

  // Administrative, admin and above, bounded by outranking at the API. Used by the accounts screen so a
  // client admin can correct a colleague's name without anyone escalating.
  updateUserProfile: (id: string, v: ProfileInput) =>
    request<Profile>(`/users/${id}/profile`, { method: 'PATCH', body: JSON.stringify(v) }),
}